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ABSTRACT
The 14- day rule restricts the culturing of 
human embryos in vitro for the purposes of 
scientific research for no longer than 14 days. 
Since researchers recently developed the 
capability to exceed the 14- day limit, pressure 
to modify the rule has started to build. 
Sophia McCully argues that the limit should 
be extended to 28 days, listing numerous 
potential benefits of doing so. We contend 
that McCully has not engaged with the main 
reasons why the Warnock Committee set such 
a limit, and these still remain valid. As a result, 
her case for an extension of the 14- day rule is 
not persuasive.
INTRODUCTION
The 14- day rule restricts the culturing 
of human embryos in vitro for scien-
tific research to a maximum of 14 days. 
Proposed by the UK’s Warnock Committee 
in 1984,1 it was implemented in the UK 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990.2 The rule has been highly influential 
and adopted by many other countries.
In 1984, it was not possible to culture 
human embryos in vitro for 14 days. Recent 
scientific advances now mean it is feasible 
to culture embryos beyond this limit,3 and 
consequently, pressure is growing for the 
14- day rule to be extended.4–6
Sophia McCully has recently argued 
that it should be extended to 28 days.4 
In response, we argue that the Warnock 
Committee’s reasons for proposing the 
14- day rule are still applicable, despite 
advances in our ability to culture human 
embryos in vitro.
THE WARNOCK COMMITTEE
In 1982, in response to public concern 
regarding in vitro fertilisation, the UK 
government established a Committee of 
Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology.1 Known as the Warnock 
Committee, after its chair, Mary Warnock, 
one goal was to determine whether 
scientific research on human embryos 
should be permitted.
There were a number of tensions to 
resolve in formulating a public policy. 
The committee was aware that the general 
public held a variety of views on the 
moral status of human embryos, as did 
members of the committee.1 7 While the 
majority believed that the potential bene-
fits meant very early embryos should be 
permitted to be used for research, some 
members dissented. However, the entire 
committee shared the belief that human 
embryos were special entities deserving 
of special protection under law.1 Finally, 
the committee was concerned to maintain 
public trust in researchers.
Warnock acknowledged that their 
proposal was a compromise.8 A majority 
of the committee believed research on 
embryos should be permitted under 
licence. To help allay public fears regarding 
‘unscrupulous scientists’,1 a clear limit 
was needed. The 14- day rule met these 
requirements and could be justified based 
on an embryo’s moral status, even if the 
committee’s reasoning was controversial, 
as we later explain. The 14- day threshold 
was before the development of the ‘primi-
tive streak’ at around 15 days after fertili-
sation—the point beyond which twinning 
was no longer thought to be possible. The 
committee’s view was that prior to this 
point, the embryo could be regarded as a 
collection of cells, or a ‘pre- embryo’. Only 
after this could the embryo be regarded 
as a definite individual and a potential 
person—an entity with rights, such as the 
right to life.1 The committee also noted 
that this limit was prior to the formation 
of the central nervous system at around 
22 days, which would definitively rule out 
the possibility of the embryo experiencing 
pain.i
Given the significant influence of the 
Warnock Committee’s deliberations, we 
i This is not a claim that embryos around 
22 days of age can experience pain. 
However, recently Stuart Derbyshire and 
John Bockmann argued that some kind of 
pain experience may be possible as early 
as 12 weeks, much earlier than previous 
estimates of 24 weeks.13 A limit prior to 
the start of the development of the central 
nervous system at around 22 days rules 
out any possibility of pain experience.
believe that any proposal to extend the 
14- day rule should examine the commit-
tee’s reasoning and justify the extension 
on this basis. The two key considerations 
are maintaining public trust and providing 
a moral justification for researching 
embryos. The committee provided two 
reasons for morally justifying research on 
early embryos—the utilitarian argument, 
based on the perceived benefits of such 
research, and their argument based on 
the moral status of early embryos. We will 
examine how McCully’s proposal deals 
with each of these.
PUBLIC TRUST
Warnock, in addressing the issue of public 
trust in researchers, warns that extending 
the limit will confirm the worries of those 
who argued that the initial 14- day rule 
would be the start of a ‘slippery slope’ 
to further extensions.8 She notes that 
the case of critics is made more plau-
sible because the issue has only been 
raised since culturing beyond 14 days has 
become possible.8 This is likely to under-
mine public trust in such research, and for 
this reason, Warnock does not believe that 
the limit should be extended for now.8
McCully acknowledges that the 14- day 
rule has built considerable public trust but 
claims that worries about a slippery slope 
are not justified because the regulations 
are strict, making it illegal to slide down 
such a slope.4 She seems unaware that an 
extension of the 14- day rule is precisely 
the sort of slippery slope that opponents 
of the original act warned of.
UTILITARIAN ARGUMENT
McCully primarily focuses on the utili-
tarian argument to justify extending the 
limit to 28 days. She suggests researching 
this extended period will help to enable 
rates of miscarriage to be reduced, in vitro 
fertilization (IVF) outcomes to improve 
and the safety of new techniques such as 
gene editing to be tested. As researchers 
can access tissue from aborted fetuses that 
are more than 28 days old, currently the 
14–28 day period is a ‘black box’ about 
which little is known.
Such benefits are possible, perhaps 
likely, outcomes of extending the limit. 
However, it only became possible in 2016 
to culture embryos for up to 14 days,3 and 
so research into embryos of between 7 
and 14 days is in its infancy; most discov-
eries to date have been within the first 
7 days.9 It seems premature to lobby for 
an extension to 28 days when the current 
limit has barely begun to be exploited; 
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indeed, others arguing for an extension 
have suggested a far more conservative 
approach of 2 or 3 day increments and 
that only after extensive public consulta-
tion.6 It is also uncertain how accurately 
a postimplantation embryo culture would 
replicate the in utero environment, which 
may limit the applicability of research on 
embryos beyond 14 days.
MORAL STATUS OF EMBRYOS
McCully does not consider the Warnock 
Committee’s argument for the 14- day rule 
based on the moral status of embryos—
that only after the primitive streak appears 
is the embryo a distinct individual and a 
potential person. This seems a serious 
weakness in her proposal. Grant Castelyn5 
explains that there are three supporting 
claims for this position: first, an empirical 
claim regarding twinning; second, that 
there is a relationship between the possi-
bility of twinning and the embryo’s iden-
tity; and third, that identity is sufficient 
for moral status.
Regarding the empirical claim, almost 
40 years of embryology research has not 
significantly revised our understanding 
of individuation. The formation of the 
primitive streak still marks the start 
of gastrulation at around 14–16 days, 
when the embryo begins to differentiate 
into three separate layers, and beyond 
which twinning cannot usually occur. 
There are, however, two developments 
that may impact our understanding of 
when twinning occurs in opposing ways. 
First, research has shown that conjoined 
twins might arise—very rarely—after the 
primitive streak has formed, up to 21 
days.10 Using the Warnock Committee’s 
reasoning, this might support extending 
the limit by up to 7 days, still significantly 
less than McCully’s proposed 28- day 
limit. However, the traditional model 
of postzygotic splitting for monozygotic 
twinning has been challenged. In 2013, 
Gonzalo Herranz proposed an alternative 
model of twinning, whereby monozygotic 
twinning occurs at the first division of the 
zygote.11 Definitive evidence for either 
model is lacking,11 but if Herranz’s model 
prevails, this implies a dramatic reduction 
should be made in the 14- day limit.
An important question is the relation-
ship between twinning and individual 
identity. In the vast majority of cases, 
embryos would never undergo twinning if 
allowed to develop, and so an individual 
is almost always present much earlier 
than 14 days, despite having the capacity 
to divide. Furthermore, even if twinning 
does occur, it might be that the prefission 
individual is the same individual as one of 
the postfission individuals.ii Arguably, on 
this basis, the Warnock Committee should 
have set the limit much earlier.
Finally, let us consider the moral claim—
that if a developing individual shares its 
identity with a future person, it has special 
moral status as a potential person. There is 
an intuitive appeal to the claim that ‘I was 
once an embryo’—that each of us shares a 
numerical identity with an organism that 
existed prior to the onset of our psycho-
logical capacities. It has been employed by 
numerous ethicists to argue for the moral 
status of embryos. Although McCully 
does not directly engage this claim, she 
does briefly address the moral status of 
the embryo, citing Elsejin Kingma’s view 
that an embryo’s environment is relevant 
to its moral status.12 Kingma suggests that 
once a ‘research embryo’ is past the point 
that it can be successfully implanted (eg, a 
14- day old embryo), it has no potential to 
become a human being. This implies it is 
morally unproblematic to extend the limit 
to 28 days.
However, this reasoning also implies 
that as medical technology develops, we 
could continue to extend this limit to 
just prior to the point of viability. This 
raises the possibility of laws eventually 
permitting experimenting on ex utero 
fetuses of up to 20 weeks or more, as 
they too would have no potential to 
become persons. More problematically, as 
Kingma herself notes, as soon as ectogen-
esis becomes an option,iii this argument 
becomes unsound—for embryos of any 
age, including those less than 14 days old.
CONCLUSION
The Warnock Committee proposed 
the 14- day limit for mainly pragmatic 
reasons—a clear limit was required for 
public trust, and it represented a compro-
mise between the utilitarian argument, 
and the committee’s view that human 
embryos deserve some legal protection. 
McCully does not seriously engage with 
the Warnock Committee’s reasoning. Her 
use of Kingma’s claim that an implanted 
embryo and a ‘research embryo’ have 
differing moral status is problematic. 
McCully’s arguments could easily be used 
ii For instance, embryo A splits leading to 
embryo B and C, one of which is identical 
to embryo A. Our thanks to an anonymous 
reviewer who suggested adding this point.
iii Interestingly, the Warnock Committee 
discussed the possibility of ectogenesis 
and its potential for observing normal and 
abnormal embryonic development in the 
future.
to justify extensions beyond 28 days, 
confirming slippery slope concerns among 
critics of the current limit and possibly 
undermining public trust. As Mary 
Warnock wrote recently, the 14- day rule 
should remain in place for now.8
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